Quirin Fleckenstein
I am an assistant professor in finance at HEC Paris. My research areas are Macro-Finance, Financial Intermediation, and Corporate Finance.
Contact: fleckenstein@hec.fr
Quirin Fleckenstein
I am an assistant professor in finance at HEC Paris. My research areas are Macro-Finance, Financial Intermediation, and Corporate Finance.
Contact: fleckenstein@hec.fr
Research
Publications
Nonbank Lending and Credit Cyclicality with Manasa Gopal, German Gutierrez, and Sebastian Hillenbrand
The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 39, Issue 4, April 2026, Pages 925–966
Editor's Choice Article
Abstract:
We study the contribution of banks and nonbanks to cyclical fluctuations in the supply of syndicated loans. We find that a reduction in nonbank lending explains most of the contraction in syndicated credit and the associated employment losses during the Global Financial Crisis, while banks’ contribution is small. Looking over multiple cycles, nonbanks’ credit supply is roughly three times more cyclical than banks’, suggesting that nonbanks are the main drivers of syndicated lending cycles. A model in which government support stabilizes bank funding can explain the higher cyclicality of nonbanks.
Do Lead Arrangers Retain Their Lead Shares? with Kristian Blickle, Sebastian Hillenbrand, and Anthony Saunders
Forthcoming, Journal of Finance
Best Paper Award Muenster Banking Workshop
Abstract:
We examine how lead arrangers’ ownership stakes in syndicated loans evolve after origination, complementing prior research on lead shares at origination. Lead arrangers tend to retain shares in bank-held loans but frequently sell shares in loans distributed to institutional investors, typically within days of origination. The frequency of these loan sales has increased over time, aligning with the rise of the originate-to-distribute model. Importantly, we find no evidence that loan sales are associated with worse performance. Additional evidence suggests that exposure through other loans, temporary retention during syndication, and reputation concerns help mitigate information asymmetries in the syndicated loan market.
Working Papers
Intermediary Frictions and the Corporate Credit Cycle: Evidence From CLOs
Abstract:
I study financing frictions in collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), highly leveraged, actively managed credit funds. I provide evidence that debt-equity conflicts distort CLOs’ trading decisions, which increases their cost of debt, particularly when equity is low. This financing friction intensifies in volatile periods, raising debt costs and reducing new issuance. While CLO contracts adjust by limiting managerial discretion and increasing equity funding, these responses are costly and only partially offset the effect. Back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest a substantial impact on issuance. The results show that debt-equity conflicts can meaningfully influence investment decisions, financing costs, and credit supply dynamics in leveraged intermediaries.
Implications of Bank Access to Public Backstops: The Role of Federal Home Loan Bank Funding [Draft available upon request] with Viral V. Acharya and Bruce Tuckman
Abstract:
We use the regional banking stress of 2023 to examine the role played by Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) funding---a form of lending of next-to-last resort---in engendering bank fragility. We document that banks that failed in 2023 relied disproportionately on FHLB funding to meet deposit outflows when interest rates rose sharply in 2022. Consistent with a moral hazard from access to public backstops that are not attached with adequate regulation or supervision, we find that banks used FHLB funding to avoid selling assets and realizing mark-to-market losses so as to preserve regulatory capital. This behavior increased fragility through two distinct channels: one, banks that maintained highly leveraged balance sheets suffered additional losses as interest rates rose; and, second, banks that relied on FHLB funding faced heightened run risk from uninsured depositors due to the seniority of FHLB advances. We relate and contrast this evidence to that of 2007-08 when banks relied on FHLB funding to withstand deposit outflows in response to credit-risk related loan losses. Finally, we draw conclusions for the desirability of bank access to FHLB funding from a financial stability perspective.
The Pricing of Bonds and Loans [Draft available upon request] with Sebastian Hillenbrand, Daniel Streitz, and Fabrice Tourre
Abstract:
Standard credit models imply that bank loans trade too cheap relative to bonds, a spread premium usually attributed to ``banking services.'' Studying senior secured loans and senior unsecured bonds of the same firms, we find the loan-bond spread premium persists in the secondary market, where institutional investors rather than banks hold the loans. Yet loans do not earn higher risk-adjusted returns than bonds, suggesting the premium compensates for risks standard models miss. The premium disappears in a model that captures three empirically relevant facts: firms often default only after enterprise value falls well below total debt, bondholders recover value even when senior lenders take losses, and borrowers refinance when credit improves.